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ABSTRACT: At the end of the Second World War and immediately 
thereater, a powerful wave of repression and revolutionary terror ensued 
in all countries in Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia and Serbia, by 
exploiting antifascism for the purpose of eliminating opponents of the 
revolution. his violence was only partially dictated by the war, the “ethos 
of retaliation” and even the personal motives which inevitably accompany 
virtually every armed conlict in history, while the major part constituted 
the irst phase in a well-planned communist revolution which eliminated 
its class and political adversaries in stages. his was initially accomplished 
by extra-judiciary liquidations organized by the secret police, but then the 
primacy was assumed by show trials generally based on accusations of war 
crimes or some form of collaboration.
Key words: Yugoslavia, Europe, Serbia, Second World War, communist 
revolution, savage purges, repression
Already in the irst years ater the Second World War, Europe confront-
ed new challenges. On the one hand there was the genuine need to sanction 
the war crimes of pro-fascist and collaborationist regimes, while on the hand 
there was the peril that this process would be exploited by Bolshevik parties 
to eliminate enemies of the revolution. hus, post-war justice was not uniform 
even in the countries of Western Europe. While just a subscription to a Nazi 
newspaper could be grounds for a prison sentence in the Netherlands or Bel-
1 his work was written as part of the project entitled “Serbian Society in the Yugoslav State 
in the 20th Century: Between Democracy and Dictatorship” (number 177 016), which has been 
approved and is inanced by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.
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gium, in Austria even a conirmed Gestapo oicer could not be tried unless 
perpetration of speciic crimes were proven, with the explanation that he was 
only carrying out orders. Denaziication encountered less resistance and was 
much more vigorously implemented in the countries in which the Nazi and 
fascist ideologies had not been generally accepted. Several decades had to pass 
for awareness to be raised and for a general social condemnation to ensue. 
In France, a powerful resistance movement but also numerous instances of 
collaboration (and the burden of the historical heritage) led to a more drastic 
confrontation with collaboration than in other Western European countries, 
with some examples of political and personal abuses.2 Nonetheless, all of these 
were deviations: rather intense immediately ater liberation only to gradually 
subside with the passage of time and then processed within the system of a 
democratic state governed by laws. Since revolutionary movements were un-
able to assume authority there, there was no mass misuse of antifascism to 
crush ideological and class adversaries, which was typical in Eastern Europe, 
where there were aspirations to establish totalitarian governments.
In Eastern Europe the process of punishing collaborators and war crimi-
nals at the end of the war corresponded to the irst phase of the revolution, 
so the number of those killed on these grounds was, generally speaking, im-
measurably higher than in the West. Besides elements of justice, the process 
also assumed the tone of wartime reprisals and personal vendettas, but the 
ideological/revolutionary hue was nonetheless dominant, although at places 
2 Vichy apologists claimed that 100,000 people were executed in the “savage purges” of 1944, 
while other historians asserted that between 30,000 and 40,000 were killed in the “savage purg-
es”. De Gaulle’s government established the Historical Committee on Investigation of the Sec-
ond World War, which in the 1950s initiated research into the victims of the “savage purges”. It 
arrived at igures of 9,000 persons who were executed under charges of collaboration with the 
occupying powers, most oten without any form of trial. hese persons were killed in the period 
prior to and immediately ater liberation from Nazi occupation. he high court which tried 
high oicials of the Vichy regime handed out 18 death sentences, of which 10 were pronounced 
“in absentia”. Out of the eight death sentences, only three were actually carried out. he courts 
of justice, which tried the remaining collaborationists, issued 3,910 sentences “in absentia” and 
2,853 with the accused “in praesentia”. Out of these 2,853 sentences, De Gaulle reformulated the 
sanctions in 73 per cent of the cases, and only 767 death sentences were carried out. In France, 
over 311,000 trials based on collaboration charges were iled. Since these indictments some-
times encompassed several persons, approximately 350,000 French citizens found themselves 
facing trials. In 60 per cent of these cases, the charges were dropped. In something over 171,000 
cases, sentences were pronounced and in three quarters of the cases they were such that the 
defendants were declared guilty. Over 40,000 persons were sentenced to prison or internment, 
while 50,000 persons were subjected to “dégradation nationale”. Additionally, various institu-
tions had their own purge committees. he functioning of these committees led to the repri-
mand or dismissal of 20,000 to 28,000 persons. Julian Jackson, France: he Dark Years 1940-1944 
(New York: 2003), pp. 577-579;  Valter Laker, Istorije Evrope 1945-1992 (Belgrade: Klio, 1999), 
pp. 45-54; Ivan Janković, Na belom hlebu – smrtna kazna u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji 1804-2002 (Bel-
grade: Službeni glasnik, Klio, 2012), pp. 402-404; Vladimir Geiger, Tito i likvidacija hrvatskih 
zarobljenika u Blajburgu, at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/253542969/Vladimir-Geiger-Tito-i-
likvidacija-hrvatskih-zarobljenika-u-Blajburgu#scribd.
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diicult to discern from the other aspects. Institutions were instrumentalized 
by the communists, and they were given precise instructions for elimination 
of opponents of the revolution and stabilization of the new authorities. Fre-
quently “the baby was thrown out with the bathwater.” As opposed to France 
and other Western democracies, extra-institutional “purges” and violence in 
Eastern Europe, including Serbia and Yugoslavia, generally were not the out-
come of excesses or a “state of emergency”, but rather part of a meticulously 
worked out revolutionary plan. Political violence here was conducted in stages 
(“salami tactics” as the practice was picturesquely characterized Mátyás Ráko-
si). In the irst phase, this was done under the pretence of a reckoning with war 
criminals and collaborationists, in the second under the guise of persecution 
of “spies and traitors”, while in the third phase under the pretext of eliminating 
traitors in the Party’s own ranks. Having enclosed the circle of terror, with time 
this grew into a permanent, comprehensive and ideal system of repression that 
endured for decades. his does not mean there was no “ethos of retaliation” as 
in Western Europe. Quite the contrary was true, although this only partially 
explains the phenomenon.
Nonetheless, in Eastern Europe the intensity of post-war purges had dif-
fering intensities depending on historical and social circumstances. hey were 
thus more extensive in Poland, Greece, Bulgaria and, especially, Yugoslavia, 
as opposed to, say, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. hey were more 
intense in countries in which there was greater social polarization, conlict-
ing resistance movements, and considerably stronger communist movements, 
although matters of mental outlooks and pre-war historical legacies were also 
not without signiicance. he terror in Yugoslavia was naturally also condi-
tioned by notable nationalist rivalries, mass casualties and crimes during the 
war, powerful and opposing resistance movements, a bloody civil war and 
strong collaboration forces. All of this proceeded while a war against fascism 
was being fought on the ground, while the salvos from the Srem Front were 
echoing, while the straggling forces of the vanquished civil war opponents and 
collaborationists were being pursued. On the other hand, everything was done 
according to plan, with very little uncontrolled mayhem, conducted by institu-
tions which had a clear ideological and political objective. hus, among those 
executed, certainly many were eliminated as political and class enemies of the 
revolutionary authorities, members of pre-war political, cultural and social 
elites, members and even just sympathizers of the defeated side in the civil 
war (recruited soldiers who did not deserve death, the most benign forms of 
collaboration, etc.).3
3 For more on post-war purges in Eastern European countries, see: Karol Bartošek, “Srednja 
i Jugoistočna Evropa – žrtve komunizma? in: Crna knjiga komunizma (Zagreb: Globus, 2001); 
Richard & Ben Crampton, Atlas of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Butler & 
Tanner Ltd., 1996); Jelena Lilić, Comparison between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria - Trials of Col-
laborators 1944-1948. Master’s thesis manuscript (Hugo Valentin Center, Uppsala University, 
2013); Ričard Klog, Istorija Grčke novog doba (Belgrade: Klio, 2000); Valter Laker, Istorije Ev-
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Revolutionary justice in Serbia and Yugoslavia
As in all countries with “people’s democracies” at the close and conclusion 
of the Second World War, the judiciary, viewed through the prism of Lenin-
ist ideological notions as the “sword of the revolution”, sufered from similar 
shortcomings: broadly deined collaboration, excessive punishments, direct 
dependency on the executive authorities, and so forth. Here, repression and 
crimes at the end of the Second World War assumed the traits of anarchic 
wartime reprisals, but a careful analysis of the sources on the high number of 
slain civilians, members of the urban citizenry and the critical intelligentsia 
compels one to notice the organized eforts of the communist party to free 
itself of many political and class opponents of the revolution in the years fol-
lowing liberation under the veil of antifascism. In the irst days ater liberation, 
the punishment of those accused of collaboration was primarily in the hands 
of the OZNA (People’s Protection Department) and military bodies, although 
later, as of mid-February 1945, the switch was made to trials (courts martial, 
civilian courts and tribunals of honour). During these irst months, most of the 
apprehended were executed without a court ruling or in farcical trials which 
oten concluded with death sentences. Civic politicians, clerks in the former 
administration, as well as merchants, factory-owners, priests, the “deceitful in-
telligentsia”, wealthier peasants (“kulaks”) and others were the primary targets, 
which gave this violence a potent class revolutionary tone. By the same token, 
there were elements of mass collective persecution and reprisals against do-
mestic German, Hungarian and Italian populations due to crimes perpetrated 
during the war. he precise number of victims of the savage purges, due to the 
decades of inaccessibility of oicial security and police sources, is still being 
determined. Even so, thanks to a partial opening of the state security archives 
in Serbia and the wider region in recent years, extensive research has been con-
ducted and suicient documents have been released, so the methodology and 
intensity of the terror at the end of the war and immediately ater the liberation 
can be reconstructed with precision and on a factual basis.
he technology of the “savage purges” in Serbia, September 1944 – 
March 1945
On the basis of the thus far researched materials from various institutions 
(mainly from the State Commission on Concealed Burial Sites of Persons 
Killed ater 12 September 1944), and from many other scholarly researchers 
from Serbia and the wider region, it may be asserted that a similar scenario of 
rope 1945-1992. (Belgrade: Klio, 1999); Andzej Packovski, Pola stoleća povjesti Poljske (Zagreb: 
Globus, 2001); Ljubomir Ognjanov, Državno političeska sistema na Blgarija 1944–1948 (Soija: 
Blgarskata akademija na naukite, 1992); Dimitrij Šarlanov, Istorija na komunizma v Blgarija, 
tom 1. (Siela: 2009).
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repression and liquidations was more or less present in all Serbian cities and 
towns, while its actual intensity depended on local circumstances and the per-
sonalities of the individuals in the local organs of repression. What follows are 
only brief descriptions and observed regularities in the methods for executions 
and concealment of secret burial sites based on the research done so far.
Organisation. he purge process was mostly administered by the People’s 
Protection Department (Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda – OZNA). From its very 
inception in Drvar on 12 May 1944, the OZNA was methodologically pat-
terned ater the Soviet model as a political police managed from a single centre 
and organizationally structured to uniformly cover all of Yugoslavia. It was di-
rectly subordinated to the People’s Defence Commission of the People’s Com-
mittee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (NKOJ), the irst revolutionary govern-
ment, which was created at the second session of the Antifascist Council for 
the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). he chief of the OZNA for all 
of Yugoslavia was Aleksandar Ranković, a member of the Supreme Command 
of the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ) and the organizational 
secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 
while his deputy, at the proposal of the Soviet mission, was Svetislav “Ćeća” 
Stefanović. he OZNA for Serbia was formed on the island of Vis in June 1944, 
and Svetozar “Krcun” Penezić was appointed its irst chief. he bodies of the 
new security service were set up parallel to the seizure of individual territories, 
with the creation of a network of authorized functionaries, commissioners, 
agents and informants, thus establishing comprehensive control over Serbia’s 
population. Ater the service’s functional network was established, the execu-
tions ensued – of both war crimes suspects who had failed to lee and political 
adversaries, i.e., “people’s enemies”.4 A special OZNA station was formed in 
Belgrade, as a vital centre, immediately ater liberation, and it handled opera-
tions for the entire city. he organization was divided into precincts (16) with 
special sections, authorized agents and military envoys, a network of commis-
sioners and auxiliary units, and ixed procedures and an operating plan. A 
reporting section was also formed to take care of enemy document archives 
and to receive reports from citizens against “enemy elements”. Improvised in-
vestigative jails were formed in the precincts, whence the arrested were sent to 
central detainment facilities (Glavnjača and Đušina prisons and the Banjica 
camp).5
4 he chief of the irst section was Mile Milatović; of the second Radovan Grković, of the third 
Slobodan Krstić Uča and of the fourth Svetolik Lazarević. Kosta Nikolić, Bojan Dimitrijević, 
“OZN-na protiv narodnih neprijatelja u Srbiji – dva dokumenta”, Naša prošlost, 10 (Kraljevo 
2010): 153-161.
5 Due to the importance of the task, the irst OZNA chief for Belgrade was Slobodan Penezić, 
but he remained at this post very briely. He chose Miloš Minić as his successor, and the latter 
assumed this post at the beginning of November 1944. When he was elected to serve as the 
republic’s public prosecutor, his place was taken by a Montenegrin, Veljko Mićunović, while 
Radovan Grković became his deputy. Since Mićunović was appointed to head the Montenegrin 
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Besides the documents and reports of the OZNA, conirmation of the ex-
istence of revolutionary violence and mass executions without trials with the 
knowledge of and organized by the highest political and security oicials upon 
the liberation of Serbia and Yugoslavia can be found in the documentation 
produced by the leading protagonists of the revolution. Vladimir Dedijer cited 
Tito’s letter to Peko Dapčević, dated as early as 16 October 1944: “Urgently 
send me one of the best strong brigades, possibly from Krajina, through Bela 
Crkva to Vršac. I need them to clean out Vršac of German inhabitants”.6 In 
this regard, the polemics between Milovan Đilas and Dedijer surrounding the 
various roles in these events is interesting. Đilas conirmed that there had been 
extrajudicial persecution: “Even we entered Belgrade, we instituted the cri-
teria by which the followers of Nedić and Ljotić would be killed on the spot. 
his had already been made public even though the majority of the followers 
of Ljotić and Nedić had withdrawn with the Germans. Certainly there were 
among the slain those who would have been spared by even the harshest and 
most biased court”. However, Đilas denied that he and Ranković were the iron 
hand as Dedijer claimed, countering that Tito was pulling all of the strings, 
asking about even the minutest details: “…but Ranković was just an extension 
of Tito’s hand, sometimes strict, sometimes lenient, as needed…”7 In this re-
gard, a dispatch sent from Ranković to the OZNA for Croatia on 15 May 1945 
is quite interesting, as in it he said: “Your work in Zagreb is unsatisfactory. 
Over 10 days, only 200 bandits have been shot in liberated Zagreb. You are 
defying our orders, for we told you to act rapidly and energetically and to get 
everything done in the irst few days”.8
Slovenian historian Mitja Ferenc cited a dispatch dated 25 June 1945 which 
was sent by the deputy prime minister of the Yugoslav government at the time, 
Edvard Kardelj, to the Slovenian prime minister, Boris Kidrič, in which he 
orders him to accelerate “purges”, meaning the execution of military and civil-
ian captives, but also political adversaries: “… Not later than in the course of 
three weeks, the Tribunal of National Honour will be dissolved. Courts martial 
OZNA in September 1945, another Montenegrin communist, Jovo Kapičić, was appointed to 
this post. he irst informational section was administered by Vasilije Kovačević, and he was 
assisted by a certain Bogovac and Vidak Popović. he second section was in charge of inter-
rogations, and it was headed by Jeto Šašić, while the third, executive section was stafed Pavle 
Pekić and Stole Kovačević. A certain Simić was in charge of accommodations and provisions. 
he OZNA (UDBA) for Belgrade was directly subordinate to the OZNA (UDBA) for Yugoslavia 
until January 1948. Kosta Nikolić and Bojan Dimitrijević, “OZNA protiv narodnih neprijatelja u 
Srbiji – dva dokumenta”, Naša prošlost, 10 (2010): 153-161; Arhiv Srbije (AS), Fond BIA, Knjiga 
pritovrenika OZN-e Belgrade 1-3.
6 At the time, several hundred German captives and civilians were executed, Vladimir Dedijer, 
Novi prilozi za biograiju druga Tita III, (Zagreb: 1983), p. 145.
7 Ibid., p. 722; Milovan Đilas, Vlast (London: 1983), p. 14.
8 “Depeša Vrhovnog štaba JA – A. Rankovića upućena OZN-i za Hrvatsku”, Vladimir Geiger, 
ed., Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944–1946, Dokumenti (Zagreb: 
Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), pp. 17-20, 113.
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will only try military personnel, so everything else will be assumed by regu-
lar courts. A new amnesty will be proclaimed. You therefore do not have any 
reason to be as slow in purges as you have been so far. Kardelj”. In another 
document, the treatment of oicers is mentioned: “Oicers are to be purged 
without exception, unless you receive notiication from the OZN or the Party 
that an individual is not to be liquidated. In general, no mercy is to be shown in 
purges. Momčilo Dugalić (signed-S.C.)9 In another document, the same oi-
cer reiterated: “During purges of captives, fascist elements must be mercilessly 
executed, and in this you must aspire, if possible, to ensure that not one slips 
through”.10 he objective was obviously to execute as many people as possible 
before the amnesty was proclaimed, despite oicial bans on executions which 
came from Tito himself, but which, as became apparent, were more declarative 
in nature. Based on available sources, it can be concluded that executions in 
Slovenia were done according to the system whereby “everyone executes his 
own”. he leadership continued to see to it that the truth about mass executions 
of captives remained a strictly protected secret: “here were cases in which in-
dividual oicers spoke to others about liquidations, i.e., that they were done 
in their presence. We spoke with the division command so that such cases, or 
rather personnel, be called to account and sanctioned. Now the campaign is 
being conducted according to the party line on vigilance and conidentiality.”11
Arrests and interrogations. Ater reports from citizens, the OZNA’s 
agents would bring in the suspects, and oicers would take their statements 
and compile their card (ile). here were cases when members of Nedić’s guard, 
traic police, river guards, gendarmes, mail carriers, ireighters and similar 
uniformed individuals turned themselves in, believing that they did not vio-
late the law and “bloody their hands” in the war and thus did not retreat with 
Milan Nedić and Drago Jovanović. In the initial months, trials were, as a rule, 
secret and ictitious. In Belgrade, for example, those registered in all iles and 
lists went to Maglajska street (Dedinje neighbourhood), where people from 
the OZNA’s main headquarters inspected the execution lists.12 People from the 
16 “precinct OZNAs” were generally sent to the camp in Banjica, where their 
fate was decided. he pencilled-in comments next to the names in the ‘Log 
of OZNA Detainees’ most oten consisted of one of two words: “Banjica” or 
“shoot” (initially, it was mainly the latter word, insofar as they were in uniform 
9 Vojni Arhiv (VA), Fond Vojno-bezbednosne agencije (VBA), K.5, sv.3, list 79, br.1175, 6.5. 
1945.
10 VA, Fond VBA, K.5, sv.3, list 79, br.1175, 30.4.1945.
11 hat this was a serious threat and a strictly conidential state secret is also relected in the fact 
that later, in 1947, due to excessive talk about executions in Slovenia’s territory and under accusa-
tions of espionage, Elza Premšak, aged 32, was sentenced to death. Mitja Ferenc, Zle(Huda) jama. 
Zločin u rudarskom oknu Barbara u Hudoj jami kod Laškog (Belgrade: Heretikus, 2011), p. 51.
12 Arhiv Srbije (AS), Fond BIA, F. br. 53, Knjiga streljanih.
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or designated as a “notable enemy”).13 To be removed from the list on which 
people were placed in category ‘S’ and marked for the iring squad was, ac-
cording to statements from those involved, quite diicult.14 Particularly me-
ticulous records were maintained about representatives of civilian authority: 
village elders, private sector managers, municipal chief oicials, police oicers 
and others from the bureaucracy and white collar class. he class motive was 
foreshadowed by the fact that the documents oten also contained, next to the 
names of executed individuals or those who were on the execution list, precise 
data on title to land, real estate and other property. Persons in investigative 
custody were oten subjected to the most diverse and unbelievable forms of 
torture and abuse, as recounted in the testimony of survivors (pulling out in-
gernails, rape, mutilation, beatings, etc.).15 Attempts and initiatives by citizens 
and local authorities just ahead of liberation in 1944 (such as the Appeal of 
Citizens in Vlasotince) to end the fratricidal war, to have potential suspects 
tried before courts ater liberation and to halt all repression with the oversight 
of Allied missions, as well as many petitions signed by citizens in order to save 
individual respected public igures generally did not produce any results. Of-
ten those making the appeals were also jailed.16
13 Arhiv Srbije (AS), Fond BIA, Knjiga pritovrenika OZN-e Belgrade 1-3.
14 ,,Oslobađanje Dedinja“, Krug (1999), no. 8: 64; Srđan Cvetković, Između srpa i čekića (Bel-
grade: Institut za savremnu istoriju, 2006), p. 173.
15 Testimony of Dobrivoje Tomić from Belgrade; Testimony of Klodet Todorović from Bel-
grade; Testimony of Petar Jelenković from Zagrađe. he chief of OZNA’s third section, Jeto Šašić, 
described the atmosphere immediately ater the entry of Partisan units in Belgrade: “We went 
with a certain picture of the enemy elements that had to be arrested. Obviously there were no 
criteria yet. he operating method had not been suiciently veriied, so that sometimes we man-
aged to pack the jails with too many people, who normally should not have been in jail. I only 
know one thing, when they were already being put into cellars, I was given an assignment from 
Ranković, to go directly and with his full authorization investigate everyone who is in jail and to 
release all of those who I believed should not be in jail. Namely, even the army had largely taken 
some initiatives, these cellars were packed with masses of people, which could only compromise 
us. So we were apt to intensify our vigilance, but sometimes, in a bout of excessiveness and rigid-
ity, also deviate and remedy such oversights. he third problem that imposed itself on us was 
the question of criteria. In this sense, the situation was not suiciently clear to us, how to orient 
ourselves toward the Chetniks, meaning who to treat as criminals, and who to recruit, and just 
pass over this type of past… he Serbian State Guard. It had the character of a professional army, 
something between an army and a gendarmerie. What kind of attitude to adopt toward them, 
to what extent were the members of these enemy formation a typical fascist police army, and 
on the other hand, as a security organ, how much did they carry out certain tasks which any 
organized community has to normally perform. his was, say, the question of traic in Belgrade 
and a series of other functions which any regime must normally perform. We always had to be 
prepared to correct ourselves around this criterion and to approach it diferentially and cau-
tiously…”. Kosta Nikolić, Bojan Dimitrijević, “OZNA protiv narodnih neprijatelja u Srbiji – dva 
dokumenta”: 153-161.
16 Most signatories of the Appeal for Truce in Valsotince were taken before iring squad, in-
cluding the municipal chief Svetozar Stojanović Budić, who was publicly sentenced to death in 
Leskovac in December 1944. A DK ZTG, Inicijativa građana Vlasotinca od 13. septembra NOVJ-
u za uspostavljanje primirija; AS, Fond BIA, F 53, Knjiga streljanih - jug Srbije.
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Executions. Even ahead of the liberation of Belgrade and other cities and 
towns, the shootings of people’s enemies had already begun in many places in 
Serbia. Taking a broader perspective, even the so-called “letist errors” of 1941-
1942 were only the harbinger of this process, which were halted at the time but 
then once again became an oicial directive ater liberation. hus, already by 2 
October 1944, 13 persons had been shot and 52 imprisoned in Jablanica, while 
in Zemun 57 had been shot and orders had been issued for the execution of 
187 more, and approximately 90 persons were in jail.17 he executions were 
implemented on the basis of a previously prepared and well-conceived plan. 
he directives from the top were precise. he greatest secrecy and unlinching 
resoluteness was sought to confront reactionaries and collaborators, and those 
harbouring them. hus, one document reads as follows:
“In order to accomplish the tasks put forth by our people and our Party, 
we must heartily set to our work and become masters of our crat. One of the 
most vital tasks in general today is the destruction of domestic reaction – trai-
tors – their elimination from the very root, and the conferral of power to the 
people. In order to succeed in this, we must above all elevate and reinforce the 
organization – the OZNA. he organization of the OZNA will be elevated and 
reinforced only if we appoint as commissioners people who merit this by their 
conduct, loyalty and work. It must be recalled that the commissioners must not 
know of each other, and that they prove themselves as constructive as possible 
in their work. [...] I have noted and I have had delivered to me information that 
shootings are not being conducted properly, meaning that they are not being 
conducted in secrecy. To ensure that there are no mistakes in the future and 
that no criticism can be raised, I hereby notify you that shootings must not be 
conducted by the army, in your unit. Should the need for a shooting arise, you 
will forward the data at your disposal to me, and ater I give you permission, 
you will shoot. he shooting itself must be conducted in the utmost secrecy, 
so that even the brigade’s command staf remains unaware. I emphasize once 
more that this applies to everyone who is in your unit. Keep this in mind, for 
if you do not adhere to this, you shall be held to full accountability… If, during 
the course of purges, you come across cases of individual families maintaining 
contacts with the Chetniks in the forests, shoot the one who is suspected of 
maintaining to those contacts in the greatest secrecy, and prohibit the family 
from leaving the village and inform them that the one who was shot has been 
sent to a prison camp”.18
Ater what was normally a brief stay (only a few days or a week) in the 
OZNA’s investigative jail, without any form of court trial, the prisoners were 
taken – tied with telephone wire and in their undergarments (or, more rarely, 
17 Kosta Nikolić, Bojan Dimitrijević, “OZNA protiv narodnih neprijatelja u Srbiji – dva doku-
menta”: 153-161.
18 VA, Belgrade. Fond VBA, građa Odeljenja zaštite naroda, K-11, F-1. Depeša opunomoćenika 
47. Divizije, Ćuprija, 15, novembar 1944.
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entirely naked) – to an execution site, most oten in groups of 30 to 50. hey 
were shot at locations on the peripheries of cities, on the grounds of barracks, 
in nearby groves, on the banks of rivers and other places, usually during the 
night. According to the OZNA’s ‘Log of the Executed’, during just a single 
night, on 31 October 1944, 81 persons were taken to the Lapotince site near 
Leskovac. he iring squads usually consisted of 15-30 soldiers of the KNOJ, 
among whom not all had ammunition in their weapons. As a result of these 
shootings, the executioners oten had nervous breakdowns and endured severe 
mental anguish.19 here were instances of persons being taken to other towns 
to be shot (e.g., from the vicinity of Leskovac and Vlasotince to Pirot!!), pos-
sibly to ill local “quotas” but also to ensure that nobody recognized each other. 
his is why shootings were oten done by persons who were not from the same 
area.20 here are examples, not frequent to be sure, of shootings of minors, 
school-age children, such as Žvo Kovanović from Kragujevac (16 years of age), 
while something of a curiosity was the shooting of several ethnic Albanians 
who were born in 1933 and even 1935.21 Individual cases of the execution of 
wounded prisoners of war, who were directly taken before iring squads from 
hospitals (Vlasotince, Valjevo, Belgrade..) have also been recorded. Initially, 
families were allowed to bring food and irewood to prisoners. Just before their 
execution, families were then told not to come because the detainee had been 
“taken to Russia” or to some other camp. At certain times, lists of those shot 
were read out daily (Banjica-Belgrade) or conirmations from the OZNA on 
those shot were occasionally released (Obilićev venac, Belgrade).22
Besides authorized OZNA contingents, oten executions were performed 
by actual military units in territories under military administration. In such 
cases, there are only summary reports containing general data on the number 
of those shot. hese were characterized by a more mass character, but quite of-
ten by a certain anarchy as well, with examples of wartime reprisals, excesses in 
19 AS, Fond BIA, F 53, Knjiga streljanih jug Srbije.; Izveštaj Državne komisije za tajne grobnice 
ubijenih posle 12. septembra 1944. , Belgrade 2011; Hugo Klein, a neuropsychiatrist and advo-
cate of Freudian psychoanalysis, wrote an intriguing study in October 1945 based on a wealth 
of experience in the Military Hospital in Kovin, entitled “Wartime neurosis of Yugoslavs” which 
remained long forgotten in a drawer. In it, he spoke about several thousand patients – shock 
troopers – in the Partisan army and that this illness was partially a result of wartime trauma 
but also a deep-seated national mentality. For more, see Hugo Klajn, Ratna neuroza Jugoslovena 
(Belgrade, 1995).
20 In Pirot, for example, approximately 300 persons, mainly from Vlasotince and Leskovac, 
were shot, and the shootings ensued ater the death of the OZNA chief in Pirot, Pavle Bošković, 
under unexplained circumstances. AS, Arhiv BIA, Knjiga streljanih br. 53.
21 Sulja Adin, born in 1935, shot because he was caught “carrying ammunition for Shaban Pol-
luzha’s band”, AS, Arhiv BIA, f. 101, 46.
22 Testimony of Dobrivoj Tomić from Belgrade, Testimony of Dragan Babić from Belgrade, Tes-
timony of Milica Veselinović from Belgrade, Potvrda OZN-e o streljanju Mihaila Veselinovića, 
Potvrda OZN-e o streljanju Nićifora Babića.- Arhiv Državne komisije za tajne grobnice ubijenih 
posle 12 . septembra 1944 (ADKZTG), F1, Belgrade.
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the shootings, beatings when the prisoners of war were being taken and simi-
lar incidents.23 Oten the bodies of the executed were displayed for the pur-
pose of intimidation (public hangings) and there were also cases when civil-
ians were allowed to participate in the beatings and torture.24 here were many 
irregularities in the OZNA’s operations. It was only at the beginning of 1945 
that the highest OZNA oicials began to suggest that such practices had to be 
abandoned and that there should be a transition to a more institutionalized 
approach to repression against the people’s enemies and collaborators. On 25 
December 1944, Aleksandar Ranković, followed by Slobodan “Krcun” Penezić, 
called for an end to the practice of killing opponents without trials. Statements 
from the victims in Serbia correspond to the stance that the frenzied shoot-
ings ceased in the latter half of February 1945, ater which trials before courts 
martial and then civilian courts began to increase.25 Even the relevant sources 
specify an OZNA directive for Serbia dated 9 February 1945 issued by Penezić 
to all operatives in Serbia, on which basis the previous anomalies were clearly 
indicated and new priorities were instituted.26
Concealment of sites and records of the executed. 
Up to the end of 2012, on the basis of archival documents, reports from 
citizens and witnesses, the Commission on Concealed Burial Sites recorded 
211 such sites in the territory of Serbia. hus far, a total of 33 sites have been re-
corded and meticulously researched, and dozens of witnesses in the districts of 
Zaječar, Raša, Valjevo, Šumadija and Mačva, Belgrade and the northern Bačka 
district in Vojvodina have been interviewed. During 2011, only two oicial ex-
humations were conducted, in Potok Zmijanac (Boljevac) and on the grounds 
of the Fiat factory (Kragujevac) – which was found by chance ater demolition 
works in the parking lot. At both sites, experts ascertained that they involved 
the shooting of several dozen civilians from the nearby towns or surrounding 
communities.
he locations of secret burial sites were normally in the immediate vicinity 
of settlements, nearby parks and wooded groves near towns, on the grounds of 
23 AS, Arhiv BIA, Pregled uhapšenih, prošlih kroz zatvor i streljanih od oslobođenja do 20.06. 
1945 godine na terenu Vojvodine; Izveštaj o ubijanju ratnih zarobljenika, p 1.
24 AS, Fond BIA, Izveštaj o ubijanju ratnih zarobljenika OZN-e za Vojvodinu 20. jun 1945; For 
more on the forms of executing death sentences, see Ivan Janković, Na belom hlebu (Belgrade, 
2011), pp. 399-462. Srđan Cvetković, Izveštaj Državne komisije za tajne grobnice ubijenih posle 
12.septembra 1944. (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2011).
25 “At the beginning of February 1945, three days had passed and no one had been taken out to 
be shot, which had not happened before that” – as recorded by the priest Sava Banković in the 
OZNA jail in Niš. Sava Banković, U predvorju pakla (Vršac: 1991), p. 26.
26 he strictly conidential document no. 345 of 9 February 1945 is cited in the relevant litera-
ture. Marko Lopušina, Ubij bližnjeg svog, vol. I (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga 1997), p. 58.
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military barracks and prisons, in neighbouring villages which served as tran-
sit camps (Krupac, near Niš, Lapotince and Slavnik near Leskovac, etc.) and 
on the banks of rivers (the bridge on the Sava River near Šabac, the banks of 
the Gročica and Danube at Smederevo, etc.). An order on the amelioration of 
the land ensured that such burial sites of “fascists” and “people’s enemies” re-
mained well concealed even later. Playgrounds, schools, stadiums, parks, park-
ing lots, residential buildings, etc. subsequently emerged on top of these sites. 
he bodies of the slain were oten shallowly buried in several rows and covered 
with stone slabs (e.g., Potok Zmijanac at Boljevac or Guvnište near Vlasotince) 
in order to prevent access and animals from carrying away the bones. As in the 
case of the lists of persons executed by iring squads, it is possible that some-
where in the archives there was or still is a detailed study with a precise map 
of the locations of undisclosed burial sites, since this was deemed some form 
of state secret.27
Initially, before the system had been entirely established, at places such as 
Zaječar and Kragujevac, the families of the executed were allowed to visit the 
sites, whence they were later dispersed by force.28 At the site on the grounds of 
the Fiat factory in Kragujevac, below the parking lot where the secret burial 
ground was discovered, in December 2011 forensic investigators irst came 
upon half-burned candles, which proves that people knew about the burial site 
and that initially family members visited it.29 he proper interment of bodily 
remains by family members was later strictly forbidden, as well as any access 
to the execution grounds. he exhumation of those killed and buried at secret 
burial sites was considered a serious criminal act. Very soon, the federal au-
thorities issued to the republic bodies order no. 1253 from the Internal Afairs 
Ministry of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia on 18 May 1945, stipulating that all 
burial sites of “people’s enemies and fascists” had been proclaimed coniden-
tial, that they had to be concealed and “all traces [of their existence] removed” 
and that relatives were not to be allowed access to these locations.30
In contrast to the until now established opinions held by much of the pub-
lic, detailed and precise documentation was maintained on those who had 
27 For more see Srđan Cvetković, Izveštaj Državne komisije za tajne grobnice ubijenih posle 12. 
septembra 1944. (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010), pp. 15-21.
28 Testimony of Dobrivoj Tomić from Belgrade, Testimony of Petar Jelenković from Zagrađe.
29 Srđan Cvetković, Izveštaj Državne komisije za tajne grobnice ubijenih posle 12. septembra 
1944. za 2011. godinu, pp. 15-21.
30 here were cases around Serbia when some relative would decide on the bold step of “illegal 
exhumation”, generally with the tacit support of the local OZNA (cases in Vlasotince, Zaječar, 
etc.); Arhiv Državne komisije za tajne grobnice (ADZTG), Depeša br. 1259 Saveznog ministar-
stva za unutrašnje poslove od 18. 05. 1945. i ponovljena depeša str. pov br.63 od 9. avgusta 1946. 
o uklanjanju fašističkih grobnica - Dokumentarni materijal slovenačke Komisije za rješavanje 
pitanja prikrivenih grobišta ustupljen od strane predsednika komisije istoričara prof.dr. Mitje 
Ferenca 25.6. 2009; Zakon o sahranjivanju i grobljima Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik RS, br 
53/93, 48/94, 101/ 2005.
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been executed and or who led the country, and hence there are many pre-
served lists, iles and entire bound books of the executed and anti-people’s ele-
ments. Normally the executed were irst recorded by local people’s liberation 
committees and branch oices of the OZNA, while later this information was 
forwarded to superior instances in the security services. he names of the ex-
ecuted were most oten only accompanied by a terse description: DM (Move-
ment of Draža Mihailović), SDS (Serbian Democratic Party), ZBOR (fascist 
movement of Dimitrije Ljotić), people’s enemy, enemy of the present, accom-
plice, collaborator... For women, these descriptions oten included terms such 
as spy, accomplice, prostitute... here were cases in which persons with the same 
names and surnames were shot by mistake, and then the report would contain 
a statement such as “no matter, because he was also an enemy of the present”.31
Later, during 1946, and especially ater the Cominform crisis in 1948, 
OZNA oices were given the task of bringing order to all lists and registers 
of the executed and submitting reports to higher levels.32 An order bearing 
the designation “strictly conidential, no. 54/5” was issued in Vojvodina dur-
ing Military Administration by the Commission on the Investigation of the 
Crimes of the Occupiers and their Collaborators, which sought from each lo-
cal commission the compilation of lists of the executed to be submitted to the 
Commission. At places this was no simple task, because no really precise re-
cords were maintained, so reprimands were handed down.
he OZNA in Vojvodina maintained a special card-ile of “war criminals 
and enemies” with the following classiication: convicted, sentenced (i.e., ex-
ecuted without trial) and under investigation. he discovered registers and lists 
of the executed (South Serbia, Vojvodina..) contain the names of thousands of 
individuals who were executed mostly from liberation in 1944 until the begin-
ning of 1945. A speciic feature of the “Register of Executed” is that its entries 
generally indicate that the OZNA made life and death decisions rather than 
the courts martial, which ran counter to even the efective regulations of the 
time.33
31 Arhiv Srbije (AS, Fond BIA), f. 154, Spisak likvidiranih antinarodnih elemenata, 9.
32 Milutin Popović, the OZNA’s authorized agent for the Sava-Tamnava district cited strictly 
conidential Instruction 1439/1948 which sought from the OZNA leadership the delivery of 
orderly and complete iles on persons who had been convicted or shot from 1941 to 1948. Luka 
Dragojlović, the authorized agent of the Rača district for Bajina Bašta referred to Instruction 
no.1851 of 9 Sept. 1948, while the authorized oice of the Ljubić district also had the same 
demands from the Local People’s Committee in Rošci, etc. AS, Arhiv BIA, fasc 140, Zbirka do-
kumenata o aktivnostima četnika, 16 spiskova četnika DM koji su likvidirani po oslobođenju; 
Međuopštinski istorijski arhiv Čačak (MIAČ), NOO Rošci, K-1, reg. br. 1134\46.
33 AS, Fond BIA, F 53, Knjiga streljanih –jug Srbije; Žužana Mezei, “Dokumenti arhiva Vojvo-
dine o atrocitetu u Vojvodini”, Heretikus 1-2, 2011, Belgrade 2011, 133. Just one “Register of the 
Executed” in Vojvodna contains the names of 1,006 Hungarians, 468 Croats, 211 Serbs and 65 
others.
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Pressure on the families of people’s enemies. 
For better known and wealthier citizens alone, later than 1945 and up to 
1948, court judgements or more oten rulings on coniscation of assets (which 
oten cited a non-existent judgement and the minutes of a court martial!) were 
drated for the purpose of legalizing executions, coniscation and national-
ization of assets. hus, one OZNA memorandum from January 1945 reads, 
“For one part of those executed, our courts were asked to drat judgements for 
the purpose of publication of what had been done”, while another indicates 
that of 102 persons, “most were executed without a trial”.34 Oten the case was 
that falsehoods were spread about those who had been executed by the secret 
police in order to alleviate the impact of mass shootings, while families were 
given false hope: “Gone to Russia”; “Contacted us from Voroshilov”; “Located 
in the Borsky Mines”; “Contacted us from Trieste”; “In a camp in Siberia”, etc.35 
he families of “people’s enemies” were long stigmatized by the new authorities 
and deprived of monetary allowances and other social income. heir assets were 
coniscated and they were condemned to survive in any way they could. For a 
long time, the fate of executed family members could not even be discussed pri-
vately within that family in order to protect the children. here were examples of 
coerced movement of the families of people’s enemies in Belgrade during 1948 
and 1949, but this was, in fact, rapidly halted.36 hose suspected of aiding those 
who did not turn themselves over to the communist authorities oten ended 
up imprisoned themselves, and in many cases they were subjected to extortion 
and then paid for this indiscretion with their lives.37
How many were killed in the “savage purges” in Serbia?
he number of those killed in either extrajudicial or court-sanctioned 
post-war purges in Serbia has long been the subject of speculation by scholars 
and the broader public. Even foreign researchers made controversial estimates 
of the number of victims of the “savage purges” in Yugoslavia. Count Nikolai 
34 Vladimir Geiger, ed., Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944–1946, 
Dokumenti (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), pp. 55, 57.
35 Testimony of Branislava Pržić from Belgrade, Testimony of Dušanka Šterić from Belgrade, 
Testimony of Dobrivoje Tomić from Belgrade, Testimony of Višeslav Kostić from Leskovac, 
Testimony of Slobodan Đurić from Belgrade.
36 One of several hundred cases of persecuted “bourgeois” from Belgrade was that of the fam-
ily of the slain Law Faculty professor Ilija Pržić. his trial garnered more attention in Bulgaria 
and, of course, in the irst country of socialism, the USSR. For more on the persecution of bour-
geois families, see Nataša Milićević, Jugoslovenska vlast i srpsko građanstvo (Belgrade: Institut za 
noviju istoriju, 2009).
37 Examples of extortion and execution as accomplices and close family members were particu-
larly numerous in the peripheral mountain districts (Stara Planina, Kopaonik, Rudnik,...). AS; 
Arhiv BIA, Operacija hvatanja Dušana Petrovića Boroša.
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Tolstoy, for example, cited an unbelievable number of 350,000 persons killed in 
Yugoslavia during 1944-1945. Michael Lees, a British historian with an ainity 
for the movement of Dragoljub Mihailović, estimated approximately 250,000 
victims in Yugoslavia and roughly 100,000 in Serbia. Ljubo Sirc, Ph.D., a pro-
fessor of political economy at the University of Glasgow and the director of 
the Centre for Research into Communist Economies, who had been a member 
of the Partisans himself, estimated as many as 300,000 victims during 1944-
1945. As opposed to them, Mark Wheeler made a much more modest estimate 
of only 40,000 throughout Yugoslavia, while in his memoirs, Fitzroy Maclean 
cited only a little over 2,000 victims in Belgrade.38
he self-aggrandizing debates on the number of victims in Serbia was in 
many ways dictated by the opposing ideological views of the researchers, since 
this was matter of a very highly politically charged topic, a very high number 
of victims, and a time when it was diicult to verify any statements due to the 
inaccessibility of the relevant police and security service sources. he number 
of victims was subject to public speculation, and depending the political stand-
point, the numbers were either exaggerated or minimized, or even denied al-
together. Perhaps the closest estimate in the light of the most recent precise 
research was provided by Swiss historian Michael Portman. Ater consulting 
numerous and diverse sources and estimates, he concluded that the closest 
approximate number of those killed in the political retaliations in 1944-1950 
was 180,000 for all of Yugoslavia, out of which the number for Serbia is nearly 
75,000, consisting of approximately 20,000 Serbs (10,000 in Belgrade alone), 
as well as 50,000 German civilians (mostly killed in camps) and approximately 
5,000 Hungarian civilians. He added to this number close to 3,000 of those 
legally executed.39 his estimate, with its slightly exaggerated number of Volks-
38 Nikolaj Tolstoj, he Minister and the Massacres (London: 1991); Majkl Liz, Silovanje Srbije 
(Belgrade: BIGZ, 1994), p. 334; Mark Wheeler, “Yugoslav matters to the West”, he Daily Tel-
egraph, London, March 9, 1991.
39 Historian Veselin Đuretić estimated over 100,000 victims of the “red” terror. he most com-
prehensive journalistic research into this theme, involving interviews with hundreds of partici-
pants, victims and witnesses throughout Serbia, was conducted by the pro-Chetnik magazine 
Pogledi in 1991. he total number was estimated at 150,000 in Serbia alone, and an estimate 
for individual cities based on scarcely credible and not always reliable testimony was also giv-
en. In his book on the OZNA, Ubij bližnjeg svog, the controversial current afairs writer Marko 
Lopušina, closely associated with the intelligence community, estimated over 50,000 killed by 
the OZNA in Serbia. Participating in a discussion on this topic in a television broadcast, Ste-
van Mirković, one of the participants and a former high-ranking army oicer, said the number 
was not higher than 10,000 in Serbia and that these were mainly people who were “responsible 
for war crimes and traitors”, and he additionally claimed that 2,000-3,000 trials were conducted. 
Historian Goran Davidović from Čačak published 6,667 names of those killed in Čačak and its 
immediate vicinity from 1941 to 1958, and out of these 2,300 ater October 1944. M. Trešnjić, a 
high-ranking OZNA functionary and the head of the twelth precinct in Belgrade, a participant 
in the execution of people’s enemies, claimed for the magazine Krug a that according to his es-
timate from his own precinct (over 800 executed), the number of victims of the “savage purges” 
in Belgrade was certainly several thousand, while in Serbia as a whole not more than 30,000. 
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deutsche and underestimated number of Serbs and others, has to some extent 
been conirmed in the most recent archival research.
Many diferent estimates could also be found concerning the number of 
slain German Volksdeutsche and Hungarians in the retaliations of 1944-1945. 
Virtually the entire domicile German civilian population in Vojvodina and 
a part of the Hungarians were either interned or expelled under accusations 
of collective collaboration. Over 150,000 people certainly passed through the 
approximately 75 camps (although they were not all active at the same time) 
in Vojvodina. Due to the severe conditions (starvation, lack of medical care, 
disease, poor sanitation) in the camps, the mortality rate was high, certainly 
over 20%. Some German sources associated with victims associations initially 
spoke of over 100,000 Volksdeutsche who died in the 1944-48 period, which 
has never been backed by sources. According to data from associations of 
missing persons, newer and better-grounded research indicates 8,049 killed, 
missing or suicides upon being interned, and 47,654 who died in the camps. 
According incomplete research conducted by the Survey Committee of the 
Vojvodina Provincial Assembly, only 21,000 Vojvodina Germans have been 
recorded. An accurate number of interned and deceased is today almost im-
possible to determine with complete precision. According to some research, 
in May 1945, over 70,000 Germans and 30,000 Hungarians were residing in 
camps or settlements under an extraordinary regime. Simultaneously, it was 
noted that at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 between 20,000 and 
30,000 domicile Germans (mainly women) were deported to the Soviet Union 
for forced labour, and according to newly published Russian sources, there 
were between 10,935 and 12,364 of them.40 According to an OZNA report, 
he calculations by demographers Vladimir Žerjavić and Bogoljub Kočović were close to these 
estimates, as they estimated up to 10,000 Serbs alone ater the liberation of Belgrade and a little 
over 10,000 in the rest of Serbia. A member of the OZNA in Belgrade, B.Tomašević estimated that 
just under 7,000 were executed in Belgrade. In a monograph on the death penalty, Ivan Janković 
estimated approximately 5,000 executed only as a result of death penalties issued by courts dur-
ing 1944-45. “Partizanski zločini u Srbiji 1944–1945”, Pogledi (1991), no. 2; Lopušina, op. cit., 119, 
126; Statement by Stevan Mirković, Utisak nedelje television programme, Studio B, 21 January 
2003; “Fantomske cifre”, Politika, 2 September 2003; Goran Davidović, Zatamnjena prošlost III 
(Čačak: Međuopštinski istorijski arhiv Čačak, 2004), p. 462; Pogledi, special edition, no. 1, 2004; 
Izveštaj Anketnog odbora Skupštine Vojvodine za utvrđivanje istine o stradanju stanovništva 
1941–1948, Novi Sad 2005; “Intervju M. Trešnjića – Oslobođenje Dedinj”, Krug, no. 8, 1999; Ivan 
Janković, Smrt u prisustvu vlasti (Belgrade, 1983), p. 195; M. Portman, “Communist retaliation 
and persecution”, Tokovi istorije, 1–2 (2004), p. 74; Vladimir Žerjavić, “Demografski i ratni gubici 
Hrvatske u II svetskom ratu i poraću”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 3 (1995), ?
40 Zoran Janjetović, Nemci u Vojvodini (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju, 2009), pp. 358-360; 
Zoran Janjetović, “Disapperance of the Etthnic Germans From Yugoslavia: expulsion or emigra-
tion?”, Tokovi istorije, 1-2 (2003): p. 66; Zoran Janjetović, Between Hitler and Tito, Disappearance 
of the etnic Germans from the Vojvodina (Belgrade, Institut za noviju istoriju, 2001), p. 247; 
Vladimir Geiger, Josip Broz Tito i ratni zločini: Bleiburg – Folksdojčeri (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut 
za povijest, 2013); Udruženje nestalih i ubijenih Nemaca, “Projekat suočavanje sa totalitarnim 
nasleđem”, Crveno doba television programme, 29 February 2004, RTS 2.
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there were 130,380 Germans in Yugoslavia at the end of 1945, and out of this 
number, 117,485 were interned, mostly in Vojvodina (105,740; 30,745 men, 
54,099 women and 20,896 children). Another OZNA document states that 
this department had shot 6,763 Germans in Vojvodina. A consolidated OZNA 
overview for Vojvodina of all of those executed in the period from liberation 
in October 1944 until 20 June 1945 shows 14,069 persons who passed through 
investigative jails, of whom at least 10,360 were shot in the irst days by the 
OZNA and military units – roughly 2,000 by the OZNA and 5,000 by military 
units.41
Initially the same policy enforced against the Germans was also enforced 
against the Hungarians, but very soon, already in early December 1944, this was 
halted due to political considerations. he process of retaliation was controlled, 
but there were also local anarchic incidents. Aleksandar Kasaš stated that during 
the 103 days of Military Administration in 1944-1945, over 5,000 Hungarians in 
Bačka had fallen victim to reprisals, largely due to unselective justice. Portman’s 
data are similar: approximately 30,000 Hungarians passed through the camps, 
and approximately 5,000 were killed.42 According to an OZNA document, the 
OZNA alone executed 1,776 persons of Hungarian ethnicity in Vojvodina, while 
another cites a number of 2,240 executed by the OZNA by 20 June 1945. he 
incomplete research conducted by the Survey Committee of the Vojvodina Pro-
vincial Assembly has recorded slightly less than 5,000 Hungarians, while more 
recent and more complete research by the mixed Commission of the Serbian 
Academy of Science and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has yielded num-
bers of approximately 7,000 Hungarians and 28,000 Germans according to still 
preliminary results.43
41 AS, Fond BIA, 75, Pregled uhapšenih, prošlih kroz zatvor i streljanih od oslobođenja do 
20. 06. 1945. godine na teritoriji Vojvodine; Izveštaj II odseka OZN-e za Vojvodinu o broju 
uhapšenih i likvidiranih na teritoriji Vojvodine, Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u 
Hrvatskoj 1944–1946, Dokumenti, pp. 312, 325, Izveštaj II odseka OZN-e za Vojvodinu o broju 
uhapšenih i likvidiranih na teritoriji Vojvodine. 
42 Aleksandar Kasaš, Mađari u Vojvodini (Novi Sad, 1996), p. 326; Portman, “Communist retali-
ation and persecution”, p. 65.
43 Iz izveštaja II odseka OZN-e za Vojvodinu o broju uhapšenih i likvidiranih na teritoriji Vo-
jvodine, Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944–1946, Dokumenti, p. 
324; AS, Fond BIA, 75, Pregled uhapšenih, prošlih kroz zatvor i streljanih od oslobođenja do 20. 
06. 1945. godine na teritoriji Vojvodine; Na putu ka istini - Izveštaj Anketnog odbora Skupštine 
Vojvodine za utvrđivanje istine o stradanju stanovništva 1941–1948, (Novi Sad: 2008); Zoran 
Janjetović, Položaj Mađara u Vojvodni na kraju Drugog svetskog rata i njegovi uzroci. _polo-
zaj_madara_u_vojvodini_na_kraju_drugog_svetskog_rata_i_njegovi_uzroci.pdf; he online 
database of the Commission of the Serbian Academy of Science and the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences on the investigation of civilian victims in Vojvodina in 1941-1948 can be found at: 
http://www.vojvodinakom1941.org.rs/lt/.
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he “bloody spring” in Slovenia in 1945. 
here are also certain disagreements surrounding the mass executions of 
extradited prisoners of war in Slovenia during May-June 1945, but even the 
more modest estimates of researchers are excessive. he relevant literature and 
research most oten mention igures of over 200,000 prisoners of war (most of 
them members of the military formations of the Independent State of Croa-
tia, NDH – over 100,000) extradited by the Allies at the end of the war, while 
the number of civilians has been estimated a roughly 50-60,000. Although 
researchers more or less agree that the number of victims slain at Kočevje, 
Taharje and Kamnička Forest in May 1945 was an estimated 15,000, they difer 
on the number of victims who were Ustasha, Home Guardsmen (domobra-
ni) and civilians at Bleiburg. Dušan Bilandžić, similar to writers from certain 
émigré circles, initially spoke of as many as 200,000 Ustasha, Home Guards-
men and civilians, a igure also supported by the pro-Ljotić émigré Borislav 
Karapandžić. On the other hand, Milovan Đilas acknowledge that over 20,000 
but less than 30,000 people had been shot. A more moderate estimate ground-
ed on research was provided by Michael Lees, who wrote about 60,000-80,000 
killed in Slovenia, while the most recent serious research and demographic es-
timates indicate approximately 50,000 “victims of Bleiburg and the Ways of the 
Cross”. Martina Grahek and Vladimir Geiger, however, mentioned a rough to-
tal of 80,000 killed in Slovenia in this context, of whom 12,000 were Slovenian 
Home Guardsmen, 6,000 were Montenegrin Chetniks and about 3,000 were 
Ljotićists, former members of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (JVuO), 
Nedićists, Chetniks and civilians from Serbia. he intensity of these execu-
tions is lucidly shown by the following dispatch sent by Major General Rade 
Hamović (under his pseudonym ‘Miki’): “he brigade arrived on the 20th at 6 
a.m. We were connected to the OZNA. Our brigade’s mission was to liquidate 
Chetniks and Ustasha, of whom there are two and a half thousand. Yesterday 
the commander of our second battalion, comrade Moma Divljak, was killed 
in an accident. Today we continued with the killings. he brigade is stationed 
in the town”.44 he Slovenian State Commission and a special department in 
that country’s Internal Afairs Ministry have recorded approximately 600 sites 
at which mass executions were conducted, while the number of those killed 
has been estimated at 80,000. he largest mass graves, containing thousands of 
victims who have only been partly exhumed are Brabarin rov near Celje and 
Tezno near Maribor. Among those executed, there are approximately 13,900 
registered Slovenes (12,587 Home Guardsmen, several hundred Slovenian 
members of JVuO and 1,200 civilians).45
44 Iz knjiga depeša 15. majevičke brigade upućenih štabu XVII divizije o streljanju zarobljenih 
četnika i ustaša, 20. maj 1945. Miki (general-major Rade Hamović), Partizanska i komunistička 
represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944–1946, Dokumenti, p. 130.
45 he irst to publicly speak about the mass killings in Slovenia which occurred ater the Sec-
ond World War (May-June 1945) was Simo Dubajić, who was the Partisan commander in Lika 
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In the territory of Croatia itself, it would appear that, due to various cir-
cumstances (mass emigration of the population and army to Slovenia, a rela-
tively brief period for the state of war…) the revolutionary purges had a some-
what lesser intensity. Published documents, besides showing that everything 
proceeded under the direction and knowledge of the OZNA, also conirm the 
mass cross-over of Home Guardsmen into Partisan units. Based on recently 
published materials, it is possible to identify approximately 6,800 slain soldiers 
and civilians, disregarding vague allegations of executions and shootings based 
on court rulings.46 Based on preserved rulings, in Croatia alone the courts pro-
nounced 5,200 convictions by August 1945, and of these, over 1,500 (nearly 
30%) entailed death sentences. Ivo Banac, however, claimed that in Zagreb 
alone ater the establishment of communist authority, close to 5,000 persons 
were executed, mostly in the foothills of the mountain overlooking the city, 
while other sources assert as many as 16,000 arrested, of whom a part were 
executed in the territory of the forest at Maksimir on the city’s eastern periph-
ery.47 In Croatia, the list of individual names of victims of “the Second World 
War and immediate post-war period” is still in the process of being compiled 
and systemized. Additionally, the exact number of Italians killed from 1943 to 
1945 and thrown into the karst caverns in the Istrian hinterland known as foibe 
has still not been ascertained. Besides Slovenia and Croatia, there has been no 
systematic research on this topic in the remaining former Yugoslav republics. 
Only the “We’ll Discover the Truth” Association in Montenegro has identiied 
at the time and participant in these crimes. Speaking for the magazine Svet in 1990, he said that 
he had participated in the execution of people in Slovenia, and that he had received an order to 
kill over 30,000 domestic traitors in Kočevski rog. Dubajić said that this was done by the Dal-
matian brigade, in which the commissar was Milka Planinc, who selected about 90 of the most 
trusted communists for these shootings; Martina Grahek Ravančić, “Međunarodne konvencije 
i ekstradicija Srba iz savezničkih logora u Austriji u svibnju 1945.”, Hereticus, 1-2 (2011), 75; 
Martina Grahek Ravančić, Bleiburg i križni put 1945 (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest 2009), 
pp. 317-333; Vladimir Geiger, Tito i likvidacija hrvatskih zarobljenika u Blajburgu, at: http://
www.scribd.com/doc/253542969/Vladimir-Geiger-Tito-i-likvidacija-hrvatskih-zarobljenika-
u-Blajburgu#scribd; Vladimir Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Blajburga (Za-
greb, 1993), p. 75; Ivo Goldstein, Povijest Hrvatske 1945-2011, vol. I (Zagreb: EPH Media, 2011), 
p. 17; Dušan Bilandžić, Moderna hrvatska povijest (Zagreb,1999), p. 187; Borivoje Karapandžić, 
Jugoslovensko krvavo proleće (Belgrade, 2001); Liz, op. cit., p. 334; Milovan Đilas, Vlast (London: 
Naša reč, 1983); Poročilo komisije Vlade Republike Slovenije za rešavanje pitanja prikritih grobišč 
2005-2008, (Ljubljana, 2009).
46 Particularly interesting is the dispatch from Aleksandar Ranković to the OZNA for Croatia 
dated 15 May 1945 in which he demands that they more resolutely engage in “purges of the 
enemy”. Depeša Vrhovnog štaba JA – A. Rankovića upućena OZN-i za Hrvatsku, Partizanska i 
komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944–1946, Dokumenti, 17-20, 113; Ibid., 46 and 
73-87.
47 Ivo Goldstein, Povijest Hrvatske 1945-2011, (Zagreb: EPH Media, 2011), 47; Ivo Banac, 
“Antifašizam bez antikomunizma ne može biti demokratski stav”, Večernji list, 8 Sept. 2007; 
Mirko Vidović, “he Fate of Tito’s Prisoners of War”, in: Human Rights in Yugoslavia, Los Ange-
les 1986, 107.
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5,214 slain civilians and soldiers in the “Great Refugee Column” and 10,000 
to 20,000 people who withdrew with Pavle Đurišić toward Slovenia and were 
then largely shot there.48
Research by the State Commission on Concealed Burial Sites of 
Persons Killed Ater 12 September 1944
By the end of May 2015, the Commission on Concealed Burial Sites of 
Persons Killed Ater September 1944 had gathered data on over 56,000 per-
sons killed in post-war purges, primarily on the basis of state security archi-
val materials (Archives of Serbia, Security and Intelligence Agency Fund), as 
well as many previously inaccessible collections of the Military Archives and 
of other institutions: Archives of Yugoslavia, Historical Archives of the City 
of Belgrade, local archives, and mostly from the provincial archives and other 
local archives for the territory of Vojvodina. Additionally, the Commission 
was provided with a database of approximately 27,000 persons slain ater Sep-
tember 1944, which had already been compiled by the Survey Committee of 
the Vojvodina Provincial Assembly (2003-2008), which was processed, incor-
porated and reined into a consolidated database, accessible to all citizens at 
the website of the State Commission on Concealed Burial Sites. he base also 
encompassed a wealth of new facts, previously unknown documents and pho-
tographs from private archives, oral testimonies, etc.49 It is noteworthy here 
that these data account for only a preliminary cross-section of the research 
and that a considerable portion of the documentation for individual districts 
and cities (Belgrade, Šabac, Kragujevac...) is lacking. Over and above all of 
the anomalies, both subjective and objective, which accompany such immense 
research and lists, this is thus far the most extensive and accurate online list of 
individual victim names released in Serbia or the wider region.
48 Savo Gregović, Pucaj rat je završen (Budva: Udruženje ,,Otkrićemo istinu“, 2005); Bo-




49 As of November 2011, the Serbian Government’s State Commission on Concealed Burial 
Sites of Persons Killed ater 12 September 1944 has launched a project to develop a modern 
database which would present to the public, interested parties and institutions the data which 
the Commission had gathered in a cutting-edge and efective form. his online register of in-
dividual names (with all available personal data on the victim), the irst of its kind in Serbia, 
also supports attachments with photographs and documents and facilitates the simultaneous 
development of high-quality, rapid statistics of executions in various categories. For more, see 
the Serbian Justice Ministry’s “Open Book” Register of Victims site: http://www.otvorenaknjiga.
komisija1944.mpravde.gov.rs/.
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Structure of victims based on manner of death.
Out of the total number recorded in the database, 49,913 lost their lives, 
while 6,095 are listed as missing. According to available data, which are not yet 
inal, only slightly more than 2,800 persons in Serbia were actually sentenced 
to death by a court, while all of the rest were executed extra-judicially or they 
died in camps. In terms of percentages, based on archival sources approxi-
mately 50% of the victims in the individual name database were shot without 
being tried (over 25,000), approximately 6% (2,876) received death sentences, 
and 44% (22,371) were killed in camps or prisons. Based on the data on 6,500 
missing persons (to a large degree potentially killed!) and on the basis of in-
formation on absent documentation, the total number of those killed with-
out trial during 1944-1945 may therefore be objectively estimated at roughly 
35,000. Additionally, using these same parameters, the number of civilians 
who died or were killed in camps (mainly Volksdeutsche in Vojvodina) may 
be estimated to a minimum of 35,000. 
Structure of victims based on districts in Serbia. 
Based on place of residence classiied by districts in Serbia, thus far 
most of the data on executed individuals was gathered for Belgrade, south-
ern Bačka, southern Banat, northern Banat and Morava. hose sentenced to 
death or those who received a court verdict are for now the most numerous 
in the southern Bačka, Srem and Belgrade districts. In the total sum of those 
killed ater 12 September 1944, if civilians who died in camps are also counted, 
then by far the largest number can naturally be found in districts in Vojvodina 
(western Bačka and southern Bačka with over 10,000 and southern Banat with 
over 5,000), while based on the number of those shot without trial in Serbia, 
the highest number is from the district of Belgrade (ca. 3,500), followed by 
the districts of Morava (1,500), Zlatibor (1,200), Jablanica (ca. 1,000), Timok 
(900) and others. It is certainly worthwhile to recall that larger cities such as 
Belgrade largely do not have registers and lists of the executed as were found 
for most other settlements, so the expected number of victims is considerably 
higher.50
Structure of victims based on ethnicity. According to the database, bro-
ken down by ethnicity most of those who were shot or sentenced to death 
were Serbs (over 15,048), Germans (6,500), Hungarians (ca. 4,500) Albanians 
(1,400), and Croats (976), followed by others and those whose ethnicity was 
unknown. However, among those who died in camps as a result of harsh con-
ditions, disease or deliberate refusal to render medical care, the vast majority 
50 Using the example of Belgrade, only three of 16 registers of the executed and registers of 
detainees have been found among the precincts in the city. Individual registers for Šabac, Kragu-
jevac and several other settlements are absent – author’s note.
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are Volksdeutsche (ca. 22,000) which also makes them the most numerous 
category in the total sum of victims (27,654), followed by Serbs (15,500) and 
Hungarians (ca. 7,000) and then others. It should be noted, however, that the 
names in the sources are oten not accompanied by ethnic designations, so 
these igures are not entirely precise, although they are certainly suitable for 
an initial analysis.
Structure of victims based on social class and political ailiation. 
Based on political ailiation in the territory of central Serbia, among the 
killed most of the civilians were designated as sympathizers, collaborators 
and people’s enemies, followed by members, sympathizers and accomplices 
of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (JVuO), and collaborators with and 
members of Albanian and Bosniak Muslim militias. In Vojvodina, German 
and Hungarian civilians were the most numerous among those accused of 
collaboration, and more rarely for participation in various occupation forma-
tions and political organizations, with a surprisingly high number of Serbian 
“people’s enemies” and JVuO members, primarily in Banat, given the passivity 
and rather meagre size of this organization in that area. In Kosovo, most were 
accused of collaboration with or participation in the Ballists or other Albanian 
militias, while among the Serbs most were sympathizers and members of the 
Kosta Pećanac’s Chetnik movement or the JVuO.
he structure of the victims according to social status perhaps best illus-
trates and statistically reinforces the class and political motivations underlying 
the repression. First and foremost, it bears emphasis that among the executed 
contained in the database, almost 90% were civilians. his data signiicantly 
overturns the established picture of a so-called “Chetnik-Partisan confronta-
tion” that prevails among the general public. According to the statistics on 
the victims, the following categories predominate in terms of their position in 
the social structure: skilled tradesmen (2,775), retailers and inn-keepers (924), 
housewives (3,809), gendarmes (2,052), attorneys and judges (119), clerks 
(1,052), pupils and students (449), teachers, professors, engineers (367), vil-
lage elders, municipal chiefs and prefects (286), oicers and soldiers (857), 
priests (162), industrialists and entrepreneurs (151), actors/artists (79), blue 
collar workers (828), physicians and pharmacists (102), and journalists (68). 
Of course, in absolute terms, most were farm labourers, 9,713, on average well-
to-do smallholders, so-called “kulaks”.
Serbia has, besides many similarities to Yugoslavia and Europe as a whole, 
many speciic traits. Hundreds of unusual executions are noticeable. Exam-
ples of executions without trial of a type unseen in the broader European or 
even general Yugoslav framework include: actors (Aleksandar Cvetković, Jo-
van Tanić, members of the Čika Duško theatre troupe from Čukarica...), Red 
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Cross secretary Petar Zec, comic-strip artist Veljko Kokcar, cartoonist Drago-
slav Stojanović, academy-trained painter and dean of the Technology Faculty 
Branko Popović, law professor Ilija Pržić, etc. In Belgrade, even some traic 
and river patrol police oicers were shot. Many ordinary clerks who served in 
the Nedić government’s economic and social ministries (e.g., Milan Horvatski, 
a inancial expert employed in the ministry since 1935) were shot without trial, 
while in France and Germany, even the actual inance ministers (e.g. Hjalmar 
Schacht) and oicials in other social ministries received only prison sentences, 
while lower-level clerks were generally not even prosecuted.
Taking into account the overall share of certain categories of the popula-
tion, it is notable that in the social sense the wealthier and better educated layer 
of the population was targeted. Among the executed, the share of the “bour-
geois” city and town population, as well as the “kulaks” in rural areas (village 
elders, municipal chiefs, priests, etc.) was higher. According to the structure of 
the executed based on the materials thus far examined, it may be noted that a 
speciic aspect of Serbia in comparison to those executed in Slovenia is the im-
measurably higher share of the civilian victims (in Slovenia only about 10-15% 
civilians was registered, while in Serbia less than 20% were members of any 
military formations!). In Serbia, the executed persons generally had residence 
in the same district or in surrounding settlements and very accurate records of 
the shooting were kept, so identiication of the victims is much easier, as op-
posed to Slovenia. In Serbia, the executions were conducted by the OZNA and 
special units of the KNOJ, while in Slovenia this was mainly done by the army. 
he secret burial sites in Serbia’s territory are generally smaller and according 
to available data most oten contain 100-200 persons (an exception is probably 
Lisičiji potok in Belgrade, and perhaps several other sites in Serbia).
Structure of victims based on sex and age. 
Data from the Commission’s base indicate that among the victims there 
were a considerable number under the age of 18, 4,636 (11%), with an excep-
tionally high number of woman as well as elderly persons aged 66 and over: 
8,611 (20%). his is primarily due to the high mortality of the population least 
resistant to the weather, starvation, disease and other harsh conditions in the 
camps in Vojvodina. According to the camp registers, most died during the 
winter of 1945/1946. he most numerous was the 46-65 age group, 13,911 
(33%); followed by the 31-45 age group, ca. 8,401 (21%), and the 18-31 age 
group, 6,812 (11%). As to sex, nearly 17,000 women are listed in the data-
base (which is approximately 30%), and most of these were German women 
who died in camps in the territory of Vojvodina (ca. 14,500, almost 90% of 
all women who died). A shocking fact is that, even though this was a result of 
their internment in camps, the sum of women (ca. 17,000), children (4,600) 
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and elderly (8,600) reaches a number of roughly 30,000, which is almost 54% 
of all of those who died at the hands of the NOVJ ater 12 September 1944.
What is not contained in the database?
Finally, it is necessary to state that according to our estimates, roughly 
20-25% of the persons are missing from the database of the executed. Why? 
Partially due to the already mentioned incompleteness of the reviewed state 
security archival materials for individual districts and cities in Serbia. Second, 
it was due to the speciic aspects of the retaliations in the territory of Slove-
nia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Vojvodina under military administration in the inal 
months and the mass executions of prisoners of war which are impossible to 
register by individual names. he research conducted by the State Commission 
on Concealed Burial Sites of Persons Killed ater 12 September 1944 therefore 
does not entirely encompass the killings of soldiers and civilians from Serbia’s 
territory who withdrew toward Bosnia and partially Slovenia at the end of the 
Second World War and immediately thereater (May-June 1945). he most 
extensive mass and unselective retaliations against prisoners of war, members 
of various anti-communist and collaborationist formations, occurred in Slo-
venia. Among the killed, there were certainly about 3,000 soldiers (Ljotićists, 
Nedićists, remaining members of the JVuO) and civilians from Serbian terri-
tory. Besides numerical reports on executions sent from the ield (dispatches 
by military commanders), there is no precise list of persons killed in Slovenia 
(registers and lists of the executed) of the type found in the OZNA archives in 
Serbia in 1944-1945. he executions were conducted in line with a diferent 
method and no records of individual names were maintained.
here has also been no suiciently precise research nor are there archival 
documents on the execution of prisoners of war from the JVuO at Zelengora 
in May 1945. In the sources and relevant literature, only the total number of at 
least 6,000 persons killed, wounded and captured (and then mostly executed) 
members of the JVuO are cited, and it is impossible to discern an entirely pre-
cise number of executed prisoners and those who were slain in combat. It is 
known that out of the entire Yugoslav army together with Draža Mihailović 
only about 400 of them made their way out of encirclement.51 We have seen 
that the OZNA documents for Vojvodina summarily state that approximately 
5,000 persons were shot by the army in Vojvodina during Military Administra-
tion (October 1944 – February 1945).52 he situation was similar concerning 
51 Milan Terzić, “Gubici četnika Draže Mihailovića na Zelengori i Sutjesci”, Vojno-istorijski 
glasnik, 2 (2011): 74-82; Đilas cited a somewhat higher number in his memoirs, i.e., that ap-
proximately 7,000 were killed at Zelengora, while only about 400 survived; Milovan Đilas, Rev-
olucionarni rat (Belgrade, 1990).
52 AS, Fond BIA, 75, Pregled uhapšenih, prošlih kroz zatvor i streljanih od oslobođenja do 
20.06.1945. godine na teritoriji Vojvodine.
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events in the territory of Kosovo during the Albanian rebellion (“Shaban Pol-
luzha’s Revolt”) at the end of 1944 and early 1945, where entirely precise data 
on how many were killed and on what basis, how many soldiers and how many 
civilians, are still lacking. Generally, several thousand rebels (up to 5,000), as 
well as civilian supporters, are said to have been eliminated. In the scholarly 
literature, only numerical data are cited on the basis of ield reports, but thus 
far no precise lists and registers have been found. Under the circumstances of 
a genuine “little war” that was conducted in the territory of Kosovo, Bosnia 
and Slovenia, about which no records of individual names were maintained, 
it would appear unlikely that a completely accurate list of executed prisoners 
of war and civilians will ever be compiled, much less a diferentiation between 
the innocent and the actually guilty, as well as their degree of guilt and the suit-
ability of the punishment.53
Based on many years of archival research, and taking into account that 
many persons were let out of the State Commission’s census for objective 
reasons, the number of those killed in various types of “purges” ater Serbia’s 
liberation in 1944-1945 cannot be less than 70,000. Out of this igure, approxi-
mately 35,000 were directly shot, less than 3,000 were sentenced to death by 
courts and over 35,000 died in camps and in other ways, while in Yugoslavia as 
a whole the equivalent total is 150,000, of whom approximately 100,000 were 
executed prisoners of war and civilians, 5,000 were sentenced to death and 
roughly 50,000 died in camps and in other ways.54
53 In Kosovo’s territory ater 24 January 1945, a genuine small-scale war was waged involv-
ing approximately 40,000 NOV troops against 20,000-30,000 rebels under Shaban Polluzha’s 
command. he army’s losses were not insigniicant. here were accounts of 650 slain, 1,360 
wounded and 1,256 missing. he total number of killed on the rebel side is unclear. K. Nikolić, 
S. Cvetković, Srbi i Albanci na Kosovui Metohiji u 20 veku, Belgrade 2014, 273. B. Dimitrijević, 
Građanski rat u miru (Belgrade 2003), 94-108.
54 he oicial census of victims of the Second World War that was conducted with the as-
sistance of veterans’ organizations in 1964 arrived at a igure of up to 147,000 wartime victims 
throughout Serbia, while Kočović’s estimate indicates 227,000. he reason for this diference was 
politically motivated, i.e., the reluctance to acknowledge the victims who lost their lives ater 
Serbia’s liberation. If one takes into consideration the deaths on the Srem front, our estimates of 
the victims of the “savage purges” and the estimates of the total number of wartime victims of 
227,000 for all of Serbia by Kočović, this leads to the conclusion that almost 30% of all wartime 
victims in Serbia fell ater October 1944, while at the level of Yugoslavia this percentage would 
be far lower, at 15-20% (i.e., approximately 150,000 out of the roughly one million total victims). 
According to these death statistics, the number of victims of post-war Partisan purges comes 
immediately ater the victims of the Ustasha, and stands shoulder to shoulder with victims of the 
Germans, with the note that in Kosovo the vast majority of those killed were Albanians, while 
in Serbia proper they were Serbian non-communists and in Vojvodina they were Germans. 
For more see D. Vručinić, Demografski gubici Srbije prouzrokovani ratovima u XX veku (Bel-
grade 2007); B. Kočović, Demografski gubici u Drugom svetskom ratu, (London, 1985); Vladimir 
Žerjavić, “Demografski i ratni gubici Hrvatske u II svetskom ratu i poraću”, Časopis za suvre-
menu povijest, (1995), no. 3, Zagreb 1995.
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he number of persons convicted of war crimes and collaboration be-
fore the courts in Serbia and Yugoslavia.
In the institutional sense, the purging of society ater the period of mass ex-
ecutions without trials (in Serbia from mid-February 1945, in the western parts 
of Yugoslavia only as of May 1945) was relinquished to institutions: courts 
and commissions. hey had largely been instrumentalized and were under 
complete Party control. By exploiting antifascism in the irst years ater libera-
tion, the authorities, through the State Commission for the Prosecution of War 
Criminals and Occupation Collaborators and the monopoly over the judiciary 
and the law enforcement apparatus, not only punished actual criminals and 
collaborators, but also eliminated political and class opponents of the revolu-
tion. It is diicult to ascertain an entirely precise number of the persons who 
were tried for war crimes and collaboration before the courts; there were cer-
tainly tens of thousands of them in Yugoslavia. It is even more diicult to dis-
tinguish the genuine criminals who merited death sentences and convictions 
from those who were subject to show trials for ideological or other reasons.
At the beginning of 1945, the tribunals of honour, courts martial and civil-
ian courts began functioning in Yugoslavia. By 1953, the courts martial had 
convicted tens of thousands of persons for collaboration and war crimes. In-
ternal statistics indicate that during the 1945-1948 period, the courts martial 
alone convicted approximately 79,949 persons throughout Yugoslavia, and an 
estimated half of the latter were from Serbia’s territory. Of course, one should 
add to this number the tens of thousands of those convicted before civilian 
courts and the tribunals of honour in Yugoslavia and Serbia, in which case pre-
cise statistics are lacking for the time being. he tribunals of honour prosecuted 
lesser forms of collaboration, pronouncing sentences not longer than 10 years 
in prison, with expulsion from public life and coniscation of assets.55 Accord-
ing to an internal military document, from 1945 to 1976, the courts martial 
meted out a total of 6,685 death sentences, of which 6,663 were pronounced 
up to 1953 (98%). More precisely, in 1945-1946 alone, 5,996 or approximately 
90% of all death sentences in the post-war period were pronounced. 1945 was 
without precedent, as 5,484 were sentenced to death (of whom 4,864 were ci-
vilians). How many were actually carried out cannot be known with any accu-
racy, but based on a tendency observed in a smaller sampling, roughly 70-80%, 
or at least 4,000.56
here are exact data in the archives on the number of the State Commis-
sion’s decisions declaring persons war criminals or collaborators, but there are 
55 Srđan Cvetković, “Politička represija u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji”, Istorija 20. veka, 2 (2008): 272-314.
56 he percentage of death sentences immediately ater the war, when only courts martial were 
active (until August 1945), was over 35%; Interna brošura bivšeg predsednika Vrhovnog vojnog 
Suda Jugoslavije general potpukovnika Marka Kalođere Istorijat Vojnog pravosuđa u JNA, unpub-
lished, in this author’s possession.
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no precise data on the number of those convicted. his commission, working 
with republican and local bodies, was conceived as a sort of investigative arm 
to gather evidence for prosecutors and the OZNA. According to incomplete 
data, 938,828 reports of war crimes and criminals were forwarded to the State 
Commission, the territorial commissions and all other investigative agen-
cies. Approximately 550,000 transcripts from the interrogations of witnesses 
and suspects were compiled, approximately 20,000 original documents from 
enemy sources and several thousand photographs of crimes and their perpe-
trators were found, extensive informative/documentary materials (the press, 
posters, other publications...) of the occupiers and their collaborators were 
gathered, numerous exhumations were conducted, and other activities were 
carried out. Based on the foregoing, the State Commission and its subordinate 
territorial commissions made decisions whereby individuals were designated 
as war criminals or occupation collaborators. he commissions made approxi-
mately 120,000 decisions which proclaimed and registered 66,420 war crimi-
nals and occupation collaborators. Out of this number, 17,175 were occupiers 
and 49,245 were domestic persons. In the State Commission’s archives, there 
are 25,875 registered war criminals, of whom 8,700 are domestic persons. Out 
of this latter igure, approximately 8,000 were proclaimed so by decisions of 
the State Commission at the federal level, while the rest were received from the 
territorial commissions.57
he decisions were irst forwarded to the court martial and prosecutor’s 
oice with jurisdiction, which launched criminal prosecution until the forma-
tion of the public prosecution and the people’s courts. here was very close 
cooperation between the commissions and the OZNA (later the UDBA) in 
the investigation and initiation of criminal prosecution, as well as in pre-trial 
preparations. Certain decisions were forwarded to the Tribunals for Prosecu-
tion of Crimes and Violations of National Honour. Trials against present war 
criminals were also held before circuit courts which then sent reports to the 
Commission. However, this task was not quite diligently performed, so a rath-
er modest number of convictions can be found in the list of convictions. Even 
though this documentation is terse, ater careful analysis it proved suicient 
to demonstrate the instrumentalization of these institutions.58 Besides clear 
cases of war crimes, a broad and vague interpretation of the law led, however, 
to trials for even the most banal transgressions (the most trivial forms of eco-
nomic cooperation, the telling of jokes, singing songs lauding the occupation 
authorities, etc.). he concealed objective was to intimidate and even eliminate 
political opponents (by seizing their property) but also people who simply did 
57 Momčilo Zečević and Jovan Popović, Dokumenti iz istorije Jugoslavije I, Izveštaj koji je pod-
neo predsedenik D. Nedeljković o radu Državne komisije 1943–1948, (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 
1998), p. 44.
58 Srđan Cvetković, Između srpa i čekića, (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006), pp. 
252-253.
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not like the authorities, which is clearly relected in many of the verdicts in this 
body of documents.59
Immediately ater Serbia’s liberation, while the war was still ongoing during 
1944 and the beginning of 1945, the courts martial applied much greater rigor 
against war crimes suspects than in the subsequent period. Up to the begin-
ning of 1945, almost 70% of all trials concluded with a death sentence, while 
during 1945 this igure fell to 28%, and in the following years it came down to 
less than 20% . Individuals accused of war crimes in the initial months were 
executed for even inconsequential matters, while only a year or two later they 
would have received only a brief term in detention for the same violations. he 
number of proclaimed war crimes by individual republic in Yugoslavia also 
difered considerably, so in a certain sense one may speak of the territorialisa-
tion of guilt, strained national symmetry and political subjectivism, which were 
relected in the uneven application of criteria by the territorial commissions 
which proclaimed war crimes.60 Trials were oten conducted under a general 
media harangue, oten with falsiied evidence, pressure against defence attor-
neys and failure to observe procedural law and the right to defence. In these 
public trials, an efort was made to level the diferences between blatant col-
laborationist movements and those that were anti-communist and anti-Nazi.61
59 he State Commission, as well as the territorial commissions, were not regularly apprised of 
trials, so that entirely accurate statistics on the number and character of trials of those accused 
of war crimes and collaboration cannot be derived on the basis of the State Commission’s regis-
ter. he State Commission’s register does contain the “List of Indictments and Convictions” in 
which records by district were maintained. Here we found slightly more than 900 indictments 
and 838 convictions from districts in the Republic of Serbia, the Vojvodina Autonomous Prov-
ince and districts in Kosovo; AJ, DK-110, fasc. 826, 827, 828 and 829.
60 For example, the Serbian Territorial Commission forwarded 11,911 cases to the public pros-
ecution, the Vojvodina commission 8,812, and the Montenegrin commission 2,329, while the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatian commissions forwarded an incomparably lower number 
(just over 1,000), even though the most massive war crimes during the Second World War were 
perpetrated there. At places, as in Serbia, even reasonable doubt was suicient for someone 
to be proclaimed a war criminal, while in the territory of the most massive collaboration, i.e., 
where there was open support for the Ustasha-led NDH, even grave ofense were concealed in 
order to establish “brotherhood and unity” in the territory infected by nationalist chauvinism 
ater a horrifying civil war. It is indicative that a smaller number of Croats than Serbs was regis-
tered, and only 300 Albanians, even though it is known that the most massive genocidal crimes 
were perpetrated in the territory of the NDH by the Ustasha regime against Serbs and that the 
collaboration and crimes of the Ballists in Kosovo assumed immense proportions. Momčilo 
Zečević and Jovan Popović, Dokumenti iz istorije Jugoslavije I, Izveštaj koji je podneo predsedenik 
D. Nedeljković o radu Državne komisije 1943–1948, Belgrade 1998,44; Srđan Cvetković, Između 
srpa i čekića (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006), 252-253.
61 his could be seen in many trials, and it came to the fore mostly in the trial against Dragoljub 
Mihailović from 10 June to 15 July 1946, in which the same indictment encompassed the former 
prime minister of the government-in-exile, Slobodan Jovanović, its foreign minister Momčilo 
Ninčić, and Mihailović as the war minister, together with Milan Nedić’s ministers (Tanasije 
Dinić, Drago Jovanović) and Ljotićists (Kosta Mušicki), even though it was well known that 
a veritable “little war” was being waged between them, and that many Nedićists and Ljotićists 
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Concluding comparisons
he aforementioned facts, testifying to the number of those executed with-
out trial in the irst months ater liberation by the revolutionary authorities in 
Serbia and Yugoslavia, point to the conclusion that the regime was incompa-
rably more repressive than anywhere else in Eastern or Western Europe. he 
hypothesis on the exceptional nature of the Yugoslav case within the European 
framework is backed by the data provided above concerning the number of 
those sentenced to death, i.e. those who were executed at the end of the war on 
charges of collaboration and war crimes. In terms of the number of executed 
without trial, if even the most cautious estimates and censuses in Serbia are 
considered, one arrives at the fact that in France approximately 225 persons 
per million were killed, while in Serbia this igure was approximately 5,000 
(and over 5,8000 for Yugoslavia as a whole), which is twenty times more. A 
similar ratio can be seen in the number of those sentenced to death: in France 
it was 39 while in Serbia it was approximately 400 persons per million.
Among other European countries, it may be said that something similar 
occurred only in Bulgaria, where there was a considerable number of those 
sentenced to death (219 persons per million), while based on more modest 
estimates over 2,000 persons per million inhabitants were executed (or not 
even half as many as in Serbia!). In Poland the equivalent igure is roughly 
450, while in all other countries the situation is considerably diferent, and the 
equivalent igures run from 4 to 30 sentenced to death per million inhabitants, 
while extra-judiciary mass executions were entirely unknown. hus, according 
to all indicators, the number of those killed in Serbia is at least twice as high 
those killed in the country with the second highest number, Bulgaria, while 
in comparison to France, and particularly the rest of Europe, the number of 
those killed at the end of the war runs from twenty to even several hundred 
times higher. If the number of those killed indirectly is also counted, i.e., the 
civilians who were killed in camps and prisons (approximately an additional 
35,000 in Serbia), the share of those killed per one million inhabitants would 
grow to over 10,000, which is an infamous European record. It is possible that 
the number of those killed in Serbia is only comparable inside Yugoslavia with 
Slovenia (13,000 per million) and Croatia (roughly 12,500 per million) if one 
takes into account the aforementioned rather well-founded estimates in the 
absence of an entirely accurate census. Based on research conducted thus far, 
in Montenegro the proportion is similar to those in Croatia and Slovenia, al-
though more precise lists are still expected, while in the other former republics 
were designated with the letter “Z” (for zločinac – criminal) by the government in London. A 
member of the pre-war Democratic Party, Kosta Kumanudi, and a member of the pre-war Radi-
cal Party, Lazica Marković, were added to this already diverse group, probably to complete the 
spectrum of “reactionaries and traitors”. Out of these 24 individuals, 11 were sentenced to death, 
and 9 were shot on the night of 17 July 1946, deprived of the right to appeal and the right to a 
marked grave. See Kosta Nikolić, Dragoljub Mihailović (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2005).
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of Yugoslavia no serious research exists, although their equivalent numbers are 
certainly far lower.
Besides the exceptional nature of the repression in Serbia and Yugoslavia 
at the end of the war, the data also indicate that within Yugoslavia the repres-
sion was generally not ethnically motivated, because a considerable number 
of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Hungarians, Albanians, etc. were 
killed. In my view, two factors stood above all others: retaliation by the war-
time victors and ideological reasons, but not ethnic vengeance. he sole excep-
tion and example of collective punishment of an ethnic group is probably the 
German minority, which, besides Vojvodina, was collectively punished and 
expelled from territories throughout Eastern Europe.62
To return to the beginning: these estimates and comparisons are supposed 
to underscore the phenomenon of mass abuses of antifascism at the end of 
the war in Serbia and Yugoslavia and to place the Yugoslav experience in its 
European context while taking into consideration its speciic aspects. Based 
on the data provided concerning the methodology and intensity of executions, 
the experience of Yugoslavia and Serbia cannot be compared to the purges in 
Europe (especially not with France – with which it is most oten compared – 
nor even the experiences of most communist countries, with the exception of 
Bulgaria to some extent). Due to speciic historical and social circumstances, 
the revolutionary forces here were far more brutal and repressive, carrying out 
more systematic executions, so the number of those killed was incomparably 
higher than elsewhere. his work naturally cannot and need not provide a pre-
cise response to the question of how many of those executed and sentenced to 
death actually deserved such a fate. his is an entirely diferent question that 
can only be answered in each individual case in a rehabilitation process con-
ducted by courts of law. he only certain thing is that the published documents 
and numerical data show that the regime in Yugoslavia at the end of the war 
and even later was one of the most repressive in Eastern Europe, just as it be-
came the most liberal ater the political shit and renouncement of the Stalinist 
legacy at the beginning of the 1950s.
62 According to estimates, approximately 15 million Germans were expelled in the irst post-
war years: 7 million from Silesia, Pomerania and Eastern Prussia, 3 million from Czechoslova-
kia, 2 million from Poland and the USSR, and 2.7 million from Romania, Hungary and Yugosla-
via; Crampton, op. cit., p. 142; Janković, op. cit., p. 404.
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“Wilde Säuberungen“ in Serbien 1944-1945 mit Berücksichtigung 
Jugoslawiens
Zusammenfassung
Gegen Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges und unmittelbar nach dessen Ende 
kam es in allen osteuropäischen Ländern sowie in Jugoslawien und Serbien zu 
einer starken Welle der Repression und des revolutionären Terrors mittels In-
strumentalisierung des Antifaschismus mit dem Ziel, Gegner der Revolution 
zu eliminieren. Diese Gewalttätigkeit war nur teilweise durch den Krieg, das 
“Rachenethos“, ja sogar durch persönliche Gründe, von denen fast alle bewaf-
neten Auseinandersetzungen in der Geschichte begleitet wurden, verursacht. 
Der größte Teil dieser Gewalttätigkeit stellte aber die erste Phase einer gut ge-
planten kommunistischen Revolution dar, in der ihre Klassen- und politischen 
Gegner etappenweise eliminiert werden sollten. Zuerst wurde das durch Liqui-
dationen ohne gerichtliche Urteile in der Regie der geheimen Polizei gemacht. 
Im Prozess der Eliminierung aller Gegner übernahmen später den Vorrang 
montierte politische Gerichtsprozesse, überwiegend aufgrund von Klagen we-
gen Kriegsverbrechen oder einer Art Kollaboration.
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